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Theses. 1. Popper's methodology of science as expounded in his 1935 book Logik der
Forschung, 2 embodies an implicit conception of the social, a conception that was articulated, generalized and applied in his later works "The Poverty of Historicism", of [1944] [1945] , and
The Open Society and Its Enemies, of 1945. From the start, Popper conceives of the social in institutionalist, reformist, piecemeal and, it would also seem, consensualist terms. 2.
Treating Popper's philosophy as social all the way down to its roots in the philosophy of science, or all the way back to the first major publication, makes for a fruitful overall interpretation of his philosophy. 3 The paper is in three parts. In the first part I extract the implicit view of the social that is to be found in The Logic of Scientific Discovery. In the second part I sketch how this It also suggests that because most extant characterizations of his philosophy fail to connect with the most innovative aspect of his ideas because they totally overlook this social aspect.
-2-implicit view was articulated and generalized in "The Poverty of Historicism" and The Open
Society and Its Enemies. In the third part I develop some comments and questions towards an assessment, testing Popper's conception of the social by using it to look at the social aspects of science.
I. The Social in The Logic of Scientific Discovery
The received view of Popper's philosophy of science, as expounded by such as Salmon or Grunbaum, is that it is an argument for shifting the role of evidence in science from that of supplying positive reasons for accepting theories to that of providing negative reasons for rejecting theories. Popper is said to have proposed falsifiability as the criterion for the scientific character of theories. Thus presented, Popper can be domesticated as one playing by the rules of contemporary academic philosophy of science. By contrast, my view is that
Popper's position is subversive of the academic approach to the philosophical problems of science. He argues the necessity, if certain objections are to be overcome, of finding a solution to the problem of demarcation at the level of social institutions. My contention is that he saw the inadequacy of all narrowly philosophical approaches to the problems he was working on, and came to realize that if those problems could be solved it could only be by social technology, by decisions to reform institutions. Why he did not make this sharper and clearer in his text is not a matter I want to enter here; but I am convinced that the bold originality of his move does much to explain the woeful failure of so many in the philosophical community even to report his ideas accurately. His work demands that one think outside "disciplinary" boundaries. -3- In contrast to the received view, I would hold that The Logic of Scientific Discovery (LScD) treats science as a social institution, and re-conceives the problem of method as a problem of institutional reform. For the Popper of 1935 already there is no Crusonian science, 4 and science is not a form of personal knowledge.
5
Popper proposes a falsifiability criterion to demarcate empirical science: 'it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience' (LScD, p. 41). But immediately after he proposes his criterion of falsifiability in §7 (pp. 41-42) of L.Sc.D.,
Popper articulates three criticisms of this view. The first criticism is that it is wrong-headed to confine science to the delivery of negative information. This he answers with the argument that a statement conveys more, the more singular statements it is likely to clash with, so negative does not mean uninformative; on the contrary, information is improbability. These claims have been endorsed by keepers of the received view, yet dissatisfaction with Popper's view as a "negative" one continues to be expressed. The second objection is that falsifiability is vulnerable to the same objections as is verifiability. This is answered by introducing an important logical fact: there is an asymmetry between verification and falsification, the former being unachievable, the latter logically possible.
Endorsing a singular statement does not entail endorsing its generalization, but it does entail rejection of the generalization which is its negation. Accepting a statement such as 'here is a black swan' does not compel us to accept 'all swans are black', but it does compel us to Cooperation between persons under a régime of institutionalized rules governing procedures are necessary ingredients of science. Let me argue this by putting a few brief passages of this early work under the microscope.
-4-reject, on pain of contradicting ourselves, 'all swans are white'. It is quite unclear whether received opinion has come to terms with this simple but decisive logical fact.
The third objection Popper raises against his own preliminary criterion of demarcation is declared to seem more serious: it is easy to evade any refutation with the aid of some ad hoc hypothesis which explains the refutation away. The availability of such ad hoc devices is treated as unproblematic, since one can always introduce some auxiliary hypotheses or narrow down the denotation of some terms in the refuted theory so as to exclude the refuting case. Indeed, no contradiction is involved even in such an extreme manoeuvre as the simple refusal to acknowledge any falsifying experience whatever. The seriousness of this third objection is that it seems to neutralize the value of the proposed falsifiability criterion. If no contradiction is involved in shielding ideas from falsifying experience then any system can be adapted to satisfy this criterion of demarcation.
Popper admits the "justice" of the third objection, but goes on to say that he need not withdraw his falsifiability proposal because he is going to propose...that the empirical method shall be characterized as a method that excludes precisely those ways of evading falsification which...are logically admissible. Commission offering a proposal. Opinion may differ on the suitability of a suggested boundary, which will then be open to discussion. In order for this discussion to be fruitful, the parties to it must have some purpose in common. Thus Popper is suggesting that his demarcation criterion is a proposal for institutional reform: reform guided by the aim of ( §4, p. 37).
-6-maximizing the impact of experience on hypotheses. The proposed boundary, the guiding aim, and whether the boundary proposal subserves the aim are the obvious points for discussion.
It is easy to overlook the fact that we have here Popper's first published discussion of what he years later defended as piecemeal social engineering. We are faced with a problem, namely, setting the boundaries of science. And we have various boundary proposals, many of which take it for granted that the problem is not institutional but natural. Popper argues that none of these proposals, including his own, will withstand logical scrutiny. The demarcation problem is not solvable within logic and language. This in turn is because science is more than simply a set of statements; it is a set of statements produced in, and governed by, a social context of practices, traditions, institutions, and it is only in that social context that they can become scientific. Outside that social context the self-same statements need not be scientific. Hence, whereas the naturalistic view is not viable, the conventionalist view is viable but, Popper argues, it is objectionable because too defensive.
Popper's analysis has shown him and us that the demarcation problem is social, hence that its solution is social, i. e. social reform, and that in considering the reform of social institutions the very first question to be addressed is, what is the aim common to the reformers? He proposes that the aim of science is to learn from experience, to use, as he says, experience as a method. If experience is to be used as a method, then allowing theories to be protected from falsification by experience is inadvisable. Conventionalists propose ways to avoid refutation, making it possible for any statements to be scientific.
Popper offers the contrary convention of welcoming refutation, thus narrowing the range of -7- statements which can be scientific. Yet he does not explicitly go further and point up the fact that he has treated science as a social activity. He leaves it to us to notice that an agreement or convention is an arrangement between people who share an aim, and to foster that aim they undertake to follow certain agreed-upon rules. In short, they form a social institution. 7 So when we think of scientific method as Popper envisages it, we would be in error to ask the question whether he is describing it or proposing something normative. Under the pervasive influence of Kant he is, rather, proposing something constitutive: the agreement or convention he wants to put in place will create a particular design of social institution, a precondition for realizing the aim of science. Science is envisaged as consensual, because cooperation in operating its rules is necessary; as goal-directed, since it has been constructed (or reconstructed) so as to achieve an aim; it is reformable because both its aim and the effectiveness of the means to the aim can be rationally discussed and proposals brought forward for alteration; and above all it is an institution, a permanent structure to coordinate and direct human activities. -10-Science never pursues the illusory aim of making its answers final, or even probable.
Its advance is, rather, towards the infinite yet attainable aim of ever discovering new, deeper, and more general problems, and of subjecting its ever-tentative answers to ever renewed and more rigorous tests (p. 281).
II. The Elaboration and Generalization of Popper's Conception of the Social
Popper's two principal works on the philosophy of society and of politics were of democratic control over, and reform of, institutions that have just grown is not explicitly addressed in "The Poverty", but a related matter is. I refer to two sorts of reform policies, the distinction between piecemeal and utopian social engineering. In his discussion, Popper treats all institutions equally: they are hypotheses the efficacy of which we should test, and he argues that if we reform then we must proceed piecemeal because large-scale social reform is untestable and hence self-defeating.
Two other innovations introduced in "The Poverty" were a methodological rule for social explanation and a stress on the unintended consequences of institutional innovation -11-and reform. The rule of methodological individualism says that to avoid essentialism towards the social entities used in our explanatory models, we do better to think of our models in descriptive or nominalist terms, "in terms of individuals, of their attitudes, expectation, relations, etc." 9 . Although some institutions are purposely designed both they and grown institutions are part of a large network that interacts in ways too complex to predict, even in the short term. Thus institutions require maintenance, reform and sometimes dismantling, depending on how they are performing. Much of this is generalization of what was implicit but particular in The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
10
The Open Society and Its Enemies is much longer than "The Poverty" and much richer in its discussions of these matters. What are described as the social aspects of scientific method are explicitly addressed, and a strong parallel is drawn between the community of scientists united in cooperative rational pursuit of the truth, and the enlightened approach to the reform of society and social institutions in general. The specialized rationality of scientific institutions is treated as a model for democratic politics: institutional structures that enjoin open-mindedness and the critical attitude are recommended, the aim being applied or useful knowledge about the way to achieve social aims.
Science was there assessed against an aim, and its deficiencies remedied with proposals for a reformed set of values. There was no essentialist appeal to the ethos of science or anything similar; the proposed methodological rules are to be evaluated by their consequences, and the rules are intended to create an institutional situation that will promote a certain social outcome.
-12-
Popper's conception of social institutions is quite a bit more explicit and developed in
The Open Society and Its Enemies. Hypothetical knowledge itself is seen as a social institution; and institutions embody hypothetical knowledge. This is because institutions are experiments at reform or change to be implemented and tested in practice. Society accumulates knowledge in its institutions, society is thus a knowledge-accumulating entity.
This boldly generalizes the idea that scientific knowledge is social and that scientific institutions need to be constructed in such a way as to maximize their potential to foster knowledge. The anti-psychologism of The Open Society is independent, but dovetails very nicely with the anti-psychologism of The Logic of Scientific Discovery. In that latter book intersubjectivity is substituted for detachment, institutions for mental preparation, and 
Two further innovations in The Open

III. Some Comments and Questions
We find that in Popper's conception of the social there is no science without scientific institutions; there is no objectivity to science without its institutions; and the empirical method is necessarily piecemeal because it is impossible to test and try to eliminate all errors in one go. Science is a model for how we use reason to learn, and hence a model for the moral unity of mankind. It is only by cooperating in social institutions, while reducing the traditional (social and cultural) barriers to cooperation, that knowledge is obtainable at all. We are thus mutually interdependent and our mutuality has to do with a recognition that we are all in the same boat and in need of one another to accomplish such projects as and it is quite apparent that this is also Popper's model for science. Socrates conducted philosophy with a small circle of friends and hangers on, in a group that appears to have had no internal structure at all. 13 Popper must have known very well that as a model for the actual practice of science this was an idealization -to say the least. The debates surrounding towards it. 15 Popper had a golden opportunity to discuss the actual institutions of science when he and Kuhn were brought together for a debate in 1965. Instead, he made the jarring claim 16 that Kuhn was his "most interesting" critic, one who understood him better than most, and had seen clearly and named a kind of scientific activity -normal science -that was inimical Thus the client system -you take my students, I take yours -which is particularly important in science recruitment, is not seen by its operators as a method of perpetuating and entrenching mediocrity; when that happens it is treated as an unintended consequence; it is rather seen as a piece of rational ordering in an otherwise haphazard process. The bosses in the client system often do their utmost to internalize very high scientific standards in their students, even if their methods, such as ruthless bullying, might seem destructive.
If patronage, anti-democratic tendencies, power, and politics are problems for scientific institutions, then Popper's own ideas suggest some thought needs to be given to their design and manning
18
To this it might be objected that Popper thought that science aims at ever more falsifiable hypotheses, ever-deeper problems, which in his later philosophy he was content and in particular to their mechanisms for self-reform. Otherwise it is unclear where the methodological rules of the kind he puts forward find their home, in what forum and under what rules they can be debated, and how if at all the amended or supplemented rules that emerge from the debate can be promulgated.
-18-to call the truth. Ought not scientific institutions be designed and judged solely against their fostering of that aim? My answer is that there is perhaps a problem with the pursuit of truth as an organizing principle for societies or social institutions: truth can undermine organization, create problems for community building, for institutional cohesion. 19 One reason is that truth is indifferent to all other authorities, such as tradition, the law, custom, seniority, training, or hierarchy. Institutions and social relations dependent on any of these are vulnerable to truth. Furthermore, what the truth is on any matter, on Popper's view of science, is open to constant dispute. Thus there is at best the possibility of limited and temporary consensus developing around truth, not to mention the fact that truths are subject to interpretation, especially in their application. For these reasons, the scientific pursuit of the truth is a most unpromising prospect around which to organize society and its institutions. Truth and social institutions seem to be inimical to one another; either truth undercuts the very structure of the institution itself; or the institution develops structure and practices that inhibit the pursuit of truth. The sociology of how these tendencies are struggled against and partially overcome is a problem Popper's methodological revolution directs us to explore. Popper, as I have tried to show, was always a deep and penetrating thinker about society and social institutions; thus is it a matter of bitter regret that the opportunity of discussing these difficulties with him is now lost.
